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We study the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma on two social net-
works obtained from actual relational data. We find very different
cooperation levels on each of them that can not be easily under-
stood in terms of global statistical properties of both networks. We
claim that the result can be understood at the mesoscopic scale, by
studying the community structure of the networks. We explain the
dependence of the cooperation level on the temptation parameter
in terms of the internal structure of the communities and their in-
terconnections. We then test our results on community-structured,
specifically designed artificial networks, finding perfect agreement
with the observations in the real networks. Our results support the
conclusion that studies of evolutionary games on model networks
and their interpretation in terms of global properties may not be
sufficient to study specific, real social systems. In addition, the
community perspective may be helpful to interpret the origin and
behavior of existing networks as well as to design structures that
show resilient cooperative behavior.
social networks | evolution of cooperation | prisoner’s dilemma | community
analysis
Introduction
The emergence and survival of cooperation in adverse en-vironments has been, for a long time, a challenging prob-
lem for scholars in disciplines as diverse as biology, sociology
or economics [1–3]. While some partial answers have been
advanced in the last forty years [4], cooperation among un-
related individuals is far from understood. Social dilemmas,
situations in which individual rationality leads to situations
in which everyone is worse off, are a prominent example of
this conundrum [5]. Within the general framework of evolu-
tionary game theory, which is particularly well suited to study
this problem, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a paradigmatic
setting to capture the paradox of altruism persistence against
short-term benefits of egoism. In this game two players choose
between cooperation (C) or defection (D), the payoffs for the
two actions being as in the following payoff matrix (payoffs
for the row player are indicated):
C D
C
D
„
1
b
0
ǫ
«
.
[1]
Relations between different possible payoffs follow the rule
b > 1 > ǫ > 0, that immediately poses the dilemma: While
the rational choice is to defect, it leads to a highly inefficient
outcome as compared to that obtained by two cooperators.
Among the plethora of studies devoted to this issue, a
particularly important and fruitful one is the modeling of the
population as a set of non-rational, learning agents that inter-
act locally [6–11] (see [12] for a very recent review). Locality
is introduced in the model through a network on which agents
are placed. These agents then play the game only with their
neighbors (in neighborhoods that can be defined in different
ways) instead of interacting with all other agents. Learning
is introduced through imitation: after a round of games has
been carried through the whole lattice, agents look at their
neighbors and choose the strategy that has led to the highest
payoff before proceeding to the next round of games. With
these two ingredients, namely locality and imitation, it is gen-
erally observed [6, 11, 13] that states in which a sizeable part
of the population cooperates emerge (at least for values of b
not too close to 2), the mechanism for this emergence being
the formation of clusters of cooperators that can successfully
outcompete defectors.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether this mecha-
nism for the emergence of cooperation appears also in real
social networks [14]. As a first step to answer this question,
some authors have focused their interest on the influence of
certain structural features that have been observed in real net-
works on the evolution of cooperation, such as the small-world
phenomenon [15] or the scale-free character of the degree dis-
tribution [16]. A general conclusion of this research is that the
inhomogeneity of the degree distribution plays a central role
on this issue, and that it may favor the emergence of cooper-
ation. However, none of these studies deals with true social
networks, as they are all based on different types of artifi-
cial models. To our knowledge, there is only one paper about
the PD on real social networks [17], but its point of view is
dynamical and unrelated to the present one. Therefore, our
research is a first attempt to understand the relevance of con-
sidering empirical social networks as a support for the local
interactions in the framework of imitation models.
Experimental measurements on real networks
Datasets. For our research we have used two social substrates
obtained by sampling real relational data. We have chosen
these substrates instead of other social network data avail-
able, such as the IMDB network for actor collaboration in
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movies or the scientific collaborating networks, because their
links are defined through true personal exchanges. In contrast,
these other public data are bipartite networks, where links are
defined by joining the collaboration framework (movies, re-
search projects, articles, etc.) which does not necessarily im-
ply mutual interactions. Our first substrate is a social network
obtained from the email traffic between members of Univer-
sity Rovira i Virgili (in Tarragona, Spain; email network from
now on), where nodes represent individual email addresses
and undirected links between two nodes indicate bidirectional
communication (at least one email in each direction) [18].
Our second real social substrate consists of nodes represent-
ing users of the ”Pretty-Good-Privacy” encryption algorithm
(PGP network, from now on), while links trace trust rela-
tionships between those persons who sign each other’s public
keys [19]. For a comparison of some of their statistical prop-
erties see Table 1.
Dynamics.Our simulations of the PD over all the networks
(both email and PGP, as well as on the models to be intro-
duced below) follow strictly the rules in [6,8], namely:
• Initial strategies of agents are assigned randomly with
the same probability to be C or D (we have checked that
other choices for the initial fraction of C or D lead to
similar results).
• The game is played between each pair of neighbors, and
payoffs are accrued according to Eq. (1), with ǫ = 0 al-
though we checked that its value (being small, e.g. 0.01)
does not affect the results.
• Accumulated payoffs of all agents are computed by
adding up the results of the games with their neighbors
in the present turn.
• In the next round, every agent imitates the strategy
of the most successful agent in her neighborhood (ran-
domly selected if there are two or more agents with the
same payoff), after which payoffs are reset to zero.
While the networks we use are obtained from experimen-
tal measurements and, as such, are given, there are different
options for the learning rule of the agents we place on the
network. We chose to stick to the (unconditional) imitation
rule described above for a a number of reasons. From the
methodological viewpoint, imitation allows a direct compari-
son to other studies, such as [6, 8] while, on the other hand,
its deterministic character makes its numerical study much
more amenable. Importantly, for global interactions learning
by imitation ends up in global defection, and hence cooper-
ation in a local model can not be due solely to this learning
rule. From the theoretical viewpoint, it is clear that other
rules, such as best-reply, will lead straightforwardly to a fully
defecting population even with local interactions. It can be
argued that imitation is too simple a rule but, as discussed
in [9], there are several reasons why agents may fail to recog-
nize they are in a dilemma situation, which would lead them
to defection; another reason for the use of imitation is as a
mode of economizing behavior [20]. From the experimental
viewpoint, there are several reports that indicate that imita-
tion is commonly used by humans [21–23]. Finally, imitation
can be justified in psychological terms by looking at how con-
firmation and disconfirmation of beliefs are carried out [24]
and has been also proposed as a relevant force to drive the
evolution towards economic equilibrium [25]. Specific aspects
where the use of other learning mechanisms can change our
results will be discussed below (see Conclusions).
Finally, we note that the update rule for strategies is syn-
chronous, i.e., all agents update their strategy at the same
time, proceeding to a new round of the game subsequently.
Changing to a non-synchronous update is known to have non-
trivial consequences [7,26]. However, non-synchronicity is dif-
ficult to deal with in general, as the particular way to intro-
duce it comes dictated by the application of interest and dif-
ferent procedures lead to different results; that is why it has
been considered only rarely in the framework of evolutionary
game theory, and only in very simple and arguably arbitrary
ways.
Results. Let us begin by examining the results of simulations
of the PD on real social networks as a function of the temp-
tation parameter b. In Fig. 1 we plot the final density of
cooperators on the two cases addressed here, the email net-
work and the PGP network. The first remarkable feature of
these plots is the high level of cooperation attained even for
large values of b on both networks, as compared to the results
on regular lattices [6,8,11] with the same imitation dynamics.
The cooperation levels are not as high as those reported by
Santos et al. [16, 27, 28] on scale free networks, although in
their simulations the dynamics is stochastic, and therefore a
direct comparison can not be made. In this regard we also
want to stress that the two networks we are analyzing can not
be considered scale-free: The email network has a clear expo-
nential distribution of degrees, and the PGP network presents
two regions with a clear crossover from a power law behavior
with exponents −2.63 (for degree k < 40) and −4 (for degree
k > 40) indicating strongly a bounded degree distribution.
Nevertheless, the crucial result arising from Fig. 1 is that
the dependence of the level of cooperation on the temptation
parameter b is very different for both networks. As we may
see from the plots, the cooperation level on the email network
is a decreasing function of b, going from values very close to
unanymous cooperation for b & 1 to about a 15% for b close
to 2. On the contrary, the PGP network presents an almost
constant cooperation level, with a variation of a 10% at most
in all the range of b values, except for b = 2. These results
inmediately lead to the conclusion that there is no typical
behavior of the cooperation level on true social networks, at
least in the framework of the PD with imitation dynamics or
learning.
The above conclusion is further reinforced by noting that
the cooperation level in each network changes in a very dif-
ferent manner when their original structure is distorted. To
this end, we have compared the results on the two networks
with their randomized version preserving the degree of each
node, carried out through a rewiring process [29]. The pro-
cess, that consists of repeatedly choosing at random two nodes
and exchanging one neighbor of each node (also selected ran-
domly), destroys correlations between nodes (and in particu-
lar the community structure we will discuss below). Figure 1
shows clearly that playing the game on the real networks and
on their randomized versions gives rise to opposite behaviors:
On the email network cooperation reaches extremal values,
higher than the random case when b is close to 1, and lower
when b is close to its maximum limit of 2. On the contrary, on
the PGP network cooperation is higher on the random version
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for low values of the temptation b, and worse for higher values.
Remarkably, the cooperation level in the random versions of
the two networks is very similar, and close to those reported
in [27] for the configuration (random) model, although it must
be kept in mind that the dynamics is different in the latter
case; interestingly, this does not seem to induce large differ-
ences in behavior in this respect.
Discussion and hypothesis
Our two examples, email and PGP, do not seem to fit in any of
the categories previously reported in the literature for the be-
havior of the PD, which implies that the macroscopic (global,
statistical) similarities between both topologies (see Table 1)
are not determinant for the opposite behaviors observed. Fur-
thermore, the fact that randomization, while preserving the
degree distribution, drives the behavior of the two networks
to the same general pattern, indicates that neither the whole
network nor individual agents provide the clue to understand-
ing our observations. Therefore, in order to gain insight on
this problem, we must consider an intermediate, mesoscopic
organizational level as the possible source of the explanation
for the dramatic differences observed in the original systems.
This in turn requires a deeper analysis of the structure of both
networks, which is what we subsequently do.
Communities.As the key concept to understand networks at
a mesoscopic level, we propose to focus on their community
structure. Community structure is a common feature of many
networks: Communities can be qualitatively defined as sub-
graphs with dense connections within themselves and sparser
ones between them, and very generally have functional impli-
cations [30]. More quantitatively, communities are introduced
through optimizing the quality function known as modularity:
Q =
P
r(err − a
2
r), where err are the fraction of links that
connect two nodes inside the community r, ar the fraction of
links that have one or both vertices inside the community r,
and the sum extends to all communities r in a given network.
The modularity of a given partition is then the probability of
having edges falling within groups in the network minus the
expected probability in an equivalent (null case) network with
the same number of nodes, and edges placed at random pre-
serving the nodes’ degree. The community distribution of the
network is then the partition that maximizes the modularity.
Among the wide variety of algorithms available to carry out
this maximization process [31], we have chosen a divisive algo-
rithm based on Extremal Optimization (EO) heuristics [32].
A detailed description of the method is beyond the scope of
the paper, but full details can be found elsewhere [33].
Once we have determined the number and size of the net-
work communities, we focus on the study of two structural
mesoscopic characteristics: The connectivity between com-
munities and their internal organization.
Inter-community structure.To summarize the results ob-
tained from a community analysis of both social networks and
to facilitate their comparison, the outcome of our analysis is
jointly presented in Fig. 2A and Fig. 2B for the email and
PGP respectively. Each node corresponds to a community,
and a link between two nodes denotes cross-relations. In ad-
dition, the size of nodes and links gives information about
community size and number of cross-links, respectively. It
is evident from the plot that communities in the email net-
work are densely interconnected, and sparsely interconnected
in the PGP network. The calculation of the weighted de-
gree distribution (the distribution of the sums of weights of
links for each node) P (w) confirms this evidence: the email
community network has a P (w) ∼ exp−αw
2
while the PGP
community network presents a P (w) ∼ exp−βw.
Intra-community structure.The internal structure of commu-
nities in both networks also presents important differences. In
Fig. 2C and Fig. 2D we plot the aspect of representative com-
munities of the email and PGP networks, respectively. From
the plot, the differences in the internal structure are clear:
the email communities present a very homogeneous structure
when compared with the heterogeneity of the PGP commu-
nities. For a more quantitative assesment of this difference,
we have calculated the relative difference between the average
and the maximum value of the internal degree in each com-
munity, ∆H . This measure allows to grasp the heterogeneity
of the internal community structure. While ∆H ∼ 5 in the
email network, the values of ∆H in the PGP network range
from 5 up to 35, confirming our observations. In the follow-
ing, we will call local hubs the nodes in the PGP networks
responsible for the very high ∆H ≈ 30.
Discussion.Previous works have stressed the role of hubs at
a macroscopical level in PD dynamics on adaptive networks
[34–37]. Although our networks are static, it is expected that
the presence of these local hubs in PGP communities (as well
as their absence in the email ones) influences strongly the evo-
lution of the PD on these networks. To be specific, local hubs
play a double stabilizing role: First, as most nodes in the
community are directly linked to their local hub, the whole
community tends to imitate the strategy of the hub; second,
when a less connected member of the community changes her
strategy following an external node, the influence of the local
hub makes it harder for this strategy to spread to the whole
community.
On the contrary, homogeneous internal degree distribu-
tions, as in the case of the email network, lead to a behavior
that is not governed by hubs: All nodes are more or less equiv-
alent, and indeed simulations show that their strategies evolve
in a synchronized manner, at least to some degree. Therefore,
the behavior of the email network will be more dependent on
how the communities are connected among themselves. We
thus are in a position to formulate our hypothesis: the behav-
ior observed in a network with communities depends strongly
on the intra-community heterogeneity (IH) and on the inter-
community connectivity (IC). In this scenario, the robustness
of cooperation observed in the PGP network is due to its low
IC and high IH, whereas the fact that cooperation only arises
for low b in the email network arises from its high IC and low
IH.
Test of our hypothesis: model networks
Synthetic network model.As we have seen, the analysis of the
email and PGP networks raised two characteristic patterns of
the mesoscale: (i) IH, or existence or not of local hubs in
the network, and (ii) IC, the degree of connections between
communities. To test this hypothesis, we propose to use syn-
thetic networks as a benchmark in which to tune the above
mechanisms as follows:
• First we divide a number of nodes N , into m communi-
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ties of equivalent size.
• Second, we prescribe the IH. We have used as stan-
dard mechanisms for the construction of ad hoc homoge-
neous and heterogeneous communities the Erdos-Renyi
model [38] and the heterogeneous (scale-free) random
graph resulting from the Barabasi-Albert model [39],
respectively. In the first case the probability of con-
nection between two nodes is constant (pintra); in the
second case, the network grows by adding nodes with
k0 links to an initial connected core, and the probability
of connection of a node i to another existing node j is
proportional to the current degree of node j.
• Third, we prescribe the IC. We construct a unique con-
nected component by linking the communities previ-
ously generated. To interconnect the resulting commu-
nities we prescribe a new constant probability pinter to
form links between two randomly selected nodes from
the pool of communities, whenever these nodes below to
different communities. The density of cross-connections
is controlled by the probability pinter. Note that pinter
must be sufficiently large to ensure the existence of a
unique connected component, but not so high as to mask
the actual communities (i.e. an accurate detection algo-
rithm should still separate the prescribed communities).
• Finally, we check by using a community detection algo-
rithm (extremal optimization [33]) that the communi-
ties obtained at the best partition of modularity are the
prescribed ones.
We have built up four statistically significant synthetic
test networks with the same number of nodes (N = 10000)
and the same number of communities (m = 75), correspond-
ing to four extremal configurations corresponding to the com-
bination of low and high values of the IH and IC. Our expec-
tation is that the configuration corresponding to low IH and
high IC will be representative of the class of mesoscopic traits
observed in the email network; conversely, high IH and low IC
should be representative of the class of mesoscopic traits ob-
served in the PGP network. The other two cases, low IH and
low IC, and high IH and high IC should constitute interme-
diate configurations between the former ones. The statistical
properties of the so obtained networks are listed in Table 2.
At this point, we want to emphasize that the statistical
properties of the email and PGP networks (Table 1) and their
synthetic counterparts (cases A and D in Table 2) present
strong dissimilarities. First, we notice that the degree dis-
tributions of the synthetic networks are different from those
observed in real networks. In addition, the clustering coeffi-
cient of the synthetic networks is almost an order of magnitude
smaller than in the real networks. Finally, the assortativity
coefficient of the synthetic class with low IC is negative, while
the other two present positive values of assortativity. These
different statistical properties of our synthetic and empirical
networks are specially interesting for the validation process:
Since the list of similarities between the two sets of networks
has been reduced to the desired inter and intracommunity
structural properties, any agreement we may find on the be-
havior of cooperation dynamics can be safely attributed to
these mesoscopic features.
Results. Figure 3 shows the evolution of cooperation as a func-
tion of the temptation parameter b for our four synthetic net-
works. We discuss first the behavior of networks correspond-
ing to A and D configurations (the synthetic classes of the
empirical email and PGP networks, respectively). Although,
in general, the values of final density of cooperators are smaller
than those reached in the empirical cases (see Figure 1), syn-
thetic networks reproduce the qualitative behaviors of the two
real social networks in terms of sensitivity to changes of the
temptation value b. Actually, the evolution of cooperation on
the synthetic networks presents the observed tendencies even
more emphasized than the empirical ones. On the one hand,
all values of density of cooperators in case D (PGP-class) are
close to the density established as initial fraction of coopera-
tors (ρ = 0.5), revealing extraordinarily high levels of stability
of the strategies played by agents. On the other hand, the de-
crease on the cooperation level shown in case A (email-class)
is somewhat larger than that of the empirical email network
for the same range of temptation values.
Additional plots in Fig.3 help us to understand, sepa-
rately, how each mesoscopic characteristic acts over cooper-
ation. Comparing the behavior of configurations A and D
with the other two classes, B and C, we observe that when
both mesoscopic characteristics are high (configuration B),
the system presents remarkable rates of cooperation. On the
other hand, for low values of both mesoscopic characteristics
(configuration C) the sensitivity to the temptation parame-
ter is increased, the maximum level of cooperation is smaller,
and the decay on cooperation is sharper. Consequently, we
observe that IH seems to be more determinant than IC as a
stabilizing factor against changes on the temptation to defect.
Conversely, IC is more relevant to the maximum level of co-
operation reached than IH. It is then clear that the behaviors
observed on the email and PGP empirical networks (and on
their synthetic counterparts) is the result of the interplay of
both mesoscopic structural properties, since we cannot reach
case D from case A by tuning only one of them.
Conclusions
In this work we have addressed the issue of the emergence of
cooperation on true social networks in the framework of the
evolutionary PD with imitation. Our results on two different
networks show clearly that the specific details of the network
considered are very relevant to determine the level of coop-
eration reached. Our analysis of the community structure of
both networks lead us to the hypothesis that two mesoscopic
structural properties (the connectivity between communities,
IC, and their internal structure, IH) influence the evolution of
cooperation in social networks by raising or lowering the level
of cooperation and the stability of the behavior of the commu-
nities against changes on the temptation to defect. In order to
verify this claim, we have designed synthetic model networks
where these two features can be tuned as desired. Simulations
on four such synthetic networks confirmed that, though their
structural features have little in common with the empirical
ones, except for the mesoscopic characteristics under study,
the behavior of cooperation is very similar. Our models also
show that both mesoscopic structural characteristics, IH and
IC, influence the robustness of cooperation against changes
on the temptation to defect, in excellent agreement with the
observation made in the real social networks analyzed.
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We stress that, as stated in the introduction, our results
combine two ingredients: locality (given by the network) and
learning by imitation. In this paper we focus on the network
structure and find uncontestable evidence of the relevance of
IH and IC on the dynamics given by our update rule, un-
conditional imitation. This is enough to claim that network
structure has to be taken into account in general, as aggre-
gate characteristics may not give clues to understanding their
behavior. However, we realize that the question then arises as
to the influence of these network features on other dynamics.
A thorough study of this issue is beyond the present work,
because evolutionary game theory on graphs depends very
strongly on the specific rule considered, and there are very
many different choices [11–13]. In the case of the networks
studied here, it is important to have in mind that uncondi-
tional imitation leads to lower levels of cooperation [13] than
the stochastic rule used in [16] (proportional update). On
the other hand, hubs have been shown recently to play a role
similar to the one discussed here under such a proportional
update dynamics [37]. We then envisage that, at least for
that specific rule our results will apply more or less straight-
forwardly, with even higher cooperation levels. On the other
hand, best-response-type rules lead, generally speaking, to the
same outcome as well mixed populations [13], and it is clear
that in that case the network structure might control the time
to reach asymptotics, but not the final state itself. In any
event, it is clear that this issue deserves further and thorough
study.
Dwelling further on the evolutionary perspective, the work
by Egu´ıluz et al. [34] indicates that if the network is allowed
to co-evolve with the strategies, a network with hubs devel-
ops. Interestingly, in this network with hubs, the cooperation
level shows similar dependence on the temptation parameter,
much as we have found here for the PGP network. Along
similar lines, recent work by Santos et al. [36, 40] suggests a
connection between the emergence of cooperation and the evo-
lutionary appearance of degree heterogeneity. In this context,
our study, which we stress is carried out on static networks,
suggests that the cooperation levels we observe in the PD
may be related to the different origin of the two networks:
While the PGP network is spontaneously formed and with a
clearly cooperative goal in mind (namely, finding help to en-
sure communication privacy), the email network arises from
an underlying external structure, whose main purpose is not
so clearly cooperative as it involves many other aspects and
tasks. Our results would then support the existence of com-
munity structures organized around hubs with resilient coop-
erative behavior.
The above comment suggests, in addition, that our results
may be of interest for the design of hierarchies and organiza-
tions with tailored cooperation behavior. We have seen that
the email network reaches, for moderate values of the temp-
tation parameter, cooperation levels very close to the opti-
mum. Therefore, networks with this structure should be used
in order to achieve very high performance levels in terms of
cooperation. On the other hand, while the email network
is quite susceptible to an increase of the temptation param-
eter, and hence exhibits a degrading of the cooperation for
large temptations, the PGP network, with its weakly con-
nected communities with hubs, is much more robust in this
respect, and ensures cooperation for almost any temptation.
Organizations with a PGP-like structure would exhibit a very
robust cooperation, although there would always be defectors.
Further research at the mesoscopic scale, looking at different
combinations of IH and IC structures, could lead to designs
that would be both optimal and robust (such as, e.g., the
structure in Fig. 1B). Interestingly, this conclusion may carry
over to different dynamical contexts (other than evolutionary
game theory): For instance, recent results on synchronization
dynamics in a system of coupled oscillators show a strong in-
fluence of the community structure as well [41], and hence
communities have to be taken into account much in the same
way we are describing here.
Finally, we want to emphasize our main conclusion,
namely that cooperation in real social networks is a complex
issue depending on the combination of the effects of several
structural features. This result has far-reaching implications:
Thus, several previous researches have considered how cooper-
ation emerges in the PD on different model networks, includ-
ing gaussian, scale free and small world ones as paradigms of
social networks. There are two main differences between our
work and those previous ones: first, the cooperation level is in
general higher that in the model networks, and second, results
are very different for similar global parameters of the network
due to the influence of the community structure, often unde-
tected by global measurements. It is then clear that any ap-
proximation to the evolution of cooperation in social networks
based on the generalization of only one of these structural fea-
tures is far too simplistic and may be misleading. We envisage
that similar conclusions may apply to other models of coop-
eration or coordination based on other games, as arguments
based on the inter- and intra-structure of the communities
may well carry over to them. In any event, we believe that
subsequent studies on these issues should then be carried out
on a case by case basis, and should involve a careful analysis
at a mesoscopic (community) level, trying to find out whether
behaviors can be predicted or classified in classes attending to
this structure.
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Fig. 1. Evolution of cooperation in real social networks. Black lines: Density of cooperators as a function of b, obtained by numerical simulations on the email (top) and PGP
(bottom) networks. Red lines: Density of cooperators on random networks generated from the original ones by a rewiring procedure that preserves the degree distribution(see
text). The equilibrium densities of cooperators have been obtained by averaging 500 generations, after a transient time of 750 generation steps. Each point corresponds to an
average over 1000 independent simulations with 50% cooperators and defectors as the initial condition.
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Fig. 2. Community structures of the email and PGP networks. Top: Community structures of the email (A) and PGP (B) networks. Nodes correspond to communities
(where size is proportional to their number of members) and links represent cross-connections (where width corresponds to the number of inter-connetions). Bottom: Typical
examples of the communities detected in the email (C) and PGP (D) networks. Solid links join nodes of the community, dashed links join this community with others.
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Fig. 3. Evolution of cooperation in four synthetic networks. Cases A and D correspond, respectively, to the synthetic classes of networks akin to the email and PGP real
networks. In case A communities have been built as Erdos-Renyi random graphs (pintra = 1.5 × 10−1), and the probability of interconnection between communities
(pinter) is 5 × 10−2 . Communities in case D are constructed as independent scale-free networks (Barabasi-Albert with k0 = 3), and after they have been sparsely
interconnected with (pinter = 1.5 × 10
−5). Case B has been obtained from D by increasing the probability pinter to 3.5 × 10
−4, and case C corresponds to A
reducing this probability to 7.5× 10−4. Simulations have been performed as indicated in Fig. 1.
Table 1. Statistical properties of e-mail and PGP networks. N is the number of nodes of the giant component of the
network considering only those links that are bidirectional (indicating mutual acquaintance between nodes). P (k) is the degree
distribution (best fit to the data). < C > is the clustering coefficient, and r stands for the assortativity coefficient [42].
network ref. N P(k) < C > r
email [18] 1133 ∼ exp−k/9.2 0.25 0.078
PGP [19] 10680 ∼

k−2.63 if k < 40
k−4.0 if k > 40
0.26 0.238
Table 2. Statistical properties of synthetic networks with 10000 nodes and 75 communities. P (k) is the degree distribution
(best fit to the data), < C > is the clustering coefficient, and r stands for the assortativity coefficient [42].
Class P(k) < C > r
A (Low IH - High IC) ∼ exp−0.0018k
2
0.031 0.013
B (Low IH - Low IC) ∼

k−2.47 if k < 30
exp−0.047k if k > 30
0.040 -0.202
C (High IH - High IC) ∼ exp−0.003k
2
0.080 0.110
D (High IH - Low IC) ∼

k−2.38 if k < 30
exp−0.027k if k > 30
0.090 -0.308
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